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Abstract
In January 1990, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) began announcing and
explaining changes in the target cash rate. This has increased public understanding
of monetary policy and, by increasing the attention given to changes in interest
rates, has affected the way in which changes in policy are transmitted to the
economy. In addition, the discipline of having to announce and explain changes in
the target cash rate to the public has led to a clearer focus on the objectives of
monetary policy within the RBA and improved the accountability of the Bank. It has
also led to a substantial decline in the volatility of short-term interest rates and more
rapid pass-through of changes in the target cash rate into deposit and lending rates.
In Australia, as in many other countries, interest rates have tended to be adjusted in
a series of steps in the same direction. In part, this can be explained in terms of the
uncertainty that policy-makers face, and the costs involved in frequently reversing
the direction of interest-rate changes.
JEL Classification Number E58ii
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1. Introduction
Over the past decade, the monetary-policy framework in Australia has changed
substantially, with the most significant change being the adoption of an inflation
target in the early 1990s.1 There have also been changes at the operational level.
Many of these changes were part of an evolutionary process following the
deregulation of financial markets in the first half of the 1980s, but a major change
occurred in January 1990 when the Reserve Bank began to announce changes to the
stance of monetary policy, as reflected in the level of overnight interest rates. Prior
to that, it simply operated in the market and left market participants to draw their
own conclusions about policy changes.  One consequence of this move to
announcements was that interest-rate changes are now implemented as discrete, and
fairly large, steps.
This paper discusses some of the thinking behind these changes in operating
procedures and the effects that they have had on financial markets and the
transmission mechanism.  It begins by describing the main features of current
operating procedures (Section 2).  Section 3 discusses the reasons why the Bank
adopted these arrangements. Section 4 then examines the impact of the changed
procedures on financial markets, including the effects on interest-rate volatility,
market turnover, and the speed with which financial institutions adjust their deposit
and lending rates. Finally, Section 5 makes some concluding comments.
                                                                                                                                  
1 The Bank’s inflation objective is to achieve an average rate of inflation of between 2 and
3 per cent over the course of the business cycle. This objective has been formally endorsed by
the Federal Government.2
2. The Australian Framework for Implementing Monetary
Policy
2.1 Current Operating Procedures
Domestic market operations became the main mechanism for implementing
monetary policy in Australia in the mid 1980s, as part of the general trend towards
deregulation. The immediate objective of these operations is the overnight interest
rate (also known as the ‘cash’ rate), which is the instrument of monetary policy.
Since 1990, the Bank has announced an operational target for the cash rate each
time monetary policy is changed.
Market operations influence the cash rate by changing the availability of banks’
‘settlement’ balances – that is, the funds used by banks to settle payments across
their accounts at the Reserve Bank. These settlement balances are held in banks’
Exchange Settlement Accounts at the Reserve Bank, and do not count towards
reserves held for the purpose of meeting reserve ratios.2  Interest is paid on
settlement balances at a rate 10 basis points below the Bank’s target for the cash
rate.3
Exchange Settlement Accounts must be in credit at all times, so banks seek to
maintain sufficient funds in these accounts to meet their daily settlement needs – i.e.
the demand for these reserves is essentially a transactions demand, and is quite well
defined. Any tendency for reserves to move away from the level that banks regard
as desirable quickly results in pressure on the cash rate as banks attempt to restore
their holdings to the desired level. The fact that banks earn a rate of return on their
settlement balances which is only a small margin below the overnight rate means
that downward pressure on rates is limited.
                                                                                                                                  
2 The reserve  ratio on banks is set at 1 per cent of liabilities. The reserve requirement is
determined each month in relation to the previous month’s average liabilities. This reserve ratio
currently has no monetary policy significance, but effectively acts as a tax on banks (they are
paid a rate of interest 5 percentage points below the market rate).
3 In June 1997, the Bank announced its intention to increase this margin to 25 basis points.3
The Bank’s market operations are conducted in Commonwealth Government
securities (the securities issued by the Federal Government).  They involve both
outright trading and repurchase agreements, though the latter account for about
90 per cent of transactions. At times, the Bank supplements these operations with
foreign currency swaps. Any participant in the wholesale market for government
securities is eligible to deal with the Bank.4
Inter-bank settlement is on a net, deferred (next-day) basis.5 This means that the
‘exogenous’ factors which affect the banks’ cash position are largely known at the
start of each day. The Bank publishes this estimate of the cash position at 9.30 am
each day, together with its dealing intentions for the day (whether it will buy or sell,
though not the amounts). Announcements of monetary policy changes are also made
at this time.  Dealing operations are conducted later in the morning, around
10.30 am. Because the market cash position is known at the start of the day, the
Bank usually needs to engage in only one round of dealing each day to maintain the
required degree of reserve pressure.
Should, for some reason, banks wish to obtain additional reserves to those supplied
by the Bank in its morning dealing round, they (and any other market participant)
may rediscount Treasury notes at the Reserve Bank at their discretion. A substantial
penalty applies to rediscounts (75 basis points over market yields) and, given that
the cash rate rarely diverges from the target by this margin, the rediscount facility is
used only infrequently.6
2.2  History of Policy Announcements
Prior to January 1990, the Bank did not announce its monetary policy stance when
changes were implemented;  instead, market participants assessed the stance of
policy from the Bank’s actions in money markets and from changes in the
                                                                                                                                  
4 Prior to June 1996, the Bank’s dealing counterparties were restricted to a group of authorised
money market dealers (discount houses).
5 Australia is scheduled to move to a real-time gross settlement payments system over the next
year.
6 For more detail on the history of the Bank’s domestic market operations see Rankin (1992,
1995) and Battellino (1990).4
overnight interest rate. Under this arrangement, changes to policy were not always
immediately obvious to the market due to noise in the overnight rate.
This method of operation was common to a number of countries at that time. After
the difficulties experienced with administered interest rates in the 1970s, central
banks saw advantages in implementing monetary policy through market operations
and having some volatility in short-term interest rates; in particular, this was seen as
providing some flexibility in policy implementation – e.g. there was scope to start
‘snugging’ rates higher and then reverse if subsequent data did not support the
move. This arrangement was seen as allowing central banks to take timely action,
particularly in raising rates, as it avoided the risk of having to announce reversals of
policy which could be damaging to credibility. To the extent that volatility in interest
rates encouraged a public perception that markets set financial prices, it was
consistent with the then prevailing view that central banks should focus on
quantities rather than setting financial prices.
In January 1990, the Bank decided to ease policy after a prolonged period of very
tight monetary conditions in the late 1980s. There were concerns about how this
would be received in financial markets. For one thing, the change marked a reversal
of a process of policy tightening that had been going on for about two years. The
decision was also somewhat pre-emptive, and therefore ahead of a clear consensus
in the market about the need for an easing. The situation was further complicated by
the fact that a federal election was imminent, and there was a risk that in the
circumstances the easing could have been interpreted as being politically motivated.
For these reasons, it was felt that the Bank should make a public explanation of the
policy change.
This initial announcement was made mid-morning, at the end of the Bank’s dealing
session for that day and as market interest rates began to fall. The announcement
was seen as being very successful and a similar approach was followed in the
subsequent easing. The practice of announcing each policy change has continued
since, with the timing being brought forward to the start of the day – i.e. ahead of
the Bank operating in the market.
The decision to make announcements brought with it the need to make explicit the
size of the change in interest rates. Initially, the Bank gave a range for the cash
target, on the grounds that it was not sufficiently confident that it could immediately5
achieve a precise target. In the event, however, the Bank soon found that its control
over the cash rate had increased under the new arrangements, and it therefore began
to announce a single target rate. As time went on, market dynamics changed further,
with the cash rate moving quickly to the new target on the announcement – i.e.
ahead of the Bank operating in the market for the day.
The effect of the change in operating procedures on the speed of adjustment of the
actual cash rate to changes in the target rate has been estimated using the following
error-correction model,
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where  r t is the actual cash rate and  r  t  is the target cash rate.7 The equation was
estimated using daily data and over two time periods:  the first running from
1 July 1985 to 22 January 1990 (the day before the first announcement) and the
second from 23 January 1990 to 2 September 1996. In estimating the equations we
initially included seven lags of the changes in both the actual and target cash rate
and then used the general-to-specific methodology to obtain a more parsimonious
specification. The estimation results are reported in Appendix A.
As expected, the estimates for both periods indicate that eventually changes in the
target cash rate are fully reflected in the actual cash rate.  There are, however,
important differences in the two sets of results.  First, in the earlier period the
absolute daily changes in the cash rate were much larger and much less well
explained by movements in the ‘target rate’.  Second, in the period in which
announcements have been made, the actual cash rate has adjusted more quickly to
the target rate. By the day after the change in the target rate, the adjustment is
complete with the vast bulk of the adjustment occurring on the day of the policy
                                                                                                                                  
7 In the earlier period, where there was no official target cash rate, we have used the mid-point
of the informal band that guided the operations of the Bank’s domestic trading desk.6
change.8 In contrast, in the earlier period the point estimates suggest that if the
‘target rate’ was changed by 100 basis points, the actual rate would move by only
34 basis points on the day of the change; after one week the actual rate would have
moved by around 60 basis points, and after one month, by around 85 basis points.
3. The Thinking Underlying Current Arrangements
3.1 The Case for Announcements
Looking back, the Bank’s view is that there have been significant net benefits in the
practice of making announcements.  Essentially these rest on the now
well-documented  arguments for central-bank accountability.  Among the specific
benefits:
•  The discipline of having to explain to the public the reasons for policy changes
has led to greater rigour in the Bank’s internal policy debates, and a clearer
focus on the objective of the policy change.
•  Clear statements of the reasons for policy changes have led to greater
community acceptance of monetary-policy decisions, and a better
understanding in the community of the Bank’s objectives. As a by-product, it
has enhanced perceptions of the Bank’s independence, as the community now
more fully appreciates the Bank’s responsibilities for monetary-policy
decisions.
•  There are some signs that it has improved the transmission of monetary policy.
There appears to be a more direct psychological impact on households and
businesses, and the pass-through to bank interest rates is noticeably faster,
particularly when monetary policy is being tightened.  The reasons here
                                                                                                                                  
8 Prior to the Reserve Bank paying interest on settlement balances, there were opportunities for
banks to earn a small profit around the time of the change in policy by attempting to adjust
their level of float, i.e. net obligations arising from unsettled cheques. Because the interest rate
paid on the float was based on the average cash rate for the week, a change in policy late in
that week meant that banks had some scope to arbitrage between the overnight rate and the
float rate, which could slow down the adjustment of the overnight rate to the new target.7
are twofold. First, recognition lags – i.e. the time it took the market to discern a
change in policy – have been eliminated. Second, there is more pressure on
banks to respond to a publicly announced change in policy than was the case
when policy changes were discernible only to professional market participants.
The process of announcing changes to the cash rate target has some of the same
characteristics as a system of administered interest rates, and there was therefore
some concern, when the Bank decided to make policy announcements, that it would
reduce flexibility. In particular, it could lead to greater reticence in implementing
policy changes and thereby increase response lags.  In the event, however, this
concern has proved unfounded.
Overall, the move by the Bank to announce and explain each policy change is seen,
both in the Bank and in the community at large, as being a positive development and
it would be difficult to envisage circumstances in which the Bank would now move
away from this practice.
3.2 The Pattern of Interest-rate Changes
Between January 1990 and September 1996, there were 19 changes in monetary
policy – 15 easings between 1990 to 1993 as the overnight interest rate was reduced
from 18 per cent to 4.75 per cent; three tightenings in the second half of 1994; and
an easing in July 1996. Of these, one involved a change in the cash rate of 150 basis
points; eleven involved a change of 100 points; two involved a change of 75 points;
and five involved a change of 50 points.
These changes in the overnight interest rate have generally been larger than is the
case in many other developed countries; on average, the size of moves has tended to
be about twice as large as those in other English-speaking countries (Table 1).8





















Australia 3 275 92 1 50 50
US 7 300 43 3 75 25
Canada 10 450 45 17 425 25
UK 3 150 50 4 100 25
Despite the larger size of moves in Australia, interest rates have typically been
adjusted multiple times in the same direction before a move is made in the other
direction, a pattern which is common to most countries.9 The Australian experience
is summarised in Table 2.  Using data on the target cash rate, we







January 1985 – September 1996
  – Continuations 30 104 72
  – Reversals 9 142 203
  – Total 39 113 103
January 1990 – September 1996
  – Continuations 16 89 88
  – Reversals 3 75 409
  – Total 19 87 138
characterise each interest-rate change as a ‘continuation’ or a ‘reversal’, where a
‘continuation’ is a movement of the target rate in the same direction as the previous
change, while a ‘reversal’ is a move in the opposite direction. The table shows that
over the past decade the number of continuations is almost four times that of
reversals. Over the period in which changes in the target rate have been announced,
                                                                                                                                  
9 See for example Goodhart (1996) and Rudebusch (1995).9
the ratio of continuations to reversals is even higher, reflecting the long series of
reductions in interest rates in the early 1990s.
Table 2 also shows the average size of the movements in the cash rate and the
average number of days between movements. There is no systematic difference in
the average size of reversals and continuations, but as the time lengthens since the
previous policy adjustment, the probability that the next move will be a reversal
appears to increase.10
The relatively large number of continuations suggests that interest-rate changes are
positively autocorrelated. This implies that changes are predictable, in the sense that
the probability of an interest rate increase and the probability of a decrease are not
always equal. Any predictability of changes in the policy interest rate has been
criticised by some economists who argue that the authorities should set the interest
rate so that the probability that the next move is up is equal to the probability that it
is down. This argument is typically based on a model which sees a very restricted
role for monetary policy.  For example, Barro (1989) argues that the monetary
authority’s task is simply to move the nominal interest rate in line with the
equilibrium real rate, which is constantly changing in an unpredictable fashion. As a
result, changes in the nominal rate should also be unpredictable.
In contrast, if the equilibrium real rate is constant, or varies around some (constant)
average, movements in interest rates will sometimes be predictable. Suppose, for
example, that the central bank raises nominal (and real) interest rates to combat an
inflation shock. At some point in the future, one would expect that interest rates
would need to be lowered, otherwise the real interest rate would be permanently
higher. Given such an expectation, it can not be true that the interest rate is always
set at the point where the expected change over any future period is zero.  Put
simply, if there is an equilibrium nominal interest rate and the current rate is not at
the equilibrium, interest-rate changes will be predictable.
                                                                                                                                  
10 Rudebusch’s (1995) analysis of changes in the Federal Funds rate between 1974 and 1992
suggests that in the first couple of weeks after a change there is a higher probability that the
next move will be in the same direction, rather than in the opposite direction. After four weeks
the probabilities are broadly equal.10
This predictability implies that interest rate moves are followed by reversals; it does
not imply multiple movements of the policy interest rate in the same direction.
Interest rates could be moved up in response to a shock and then moved back down
in a single step to their initial value. This is the pattern that Goodhart (1996) has in
mind when he argues that an important explanation for the persistence of inflation is
that central banks ‘do not vary interest rates sufficiently aggressively, or promptly,
to hold inflation to a desired path’. The argument is that by delaying interest-rate
moves, or by moving by too small an amount, central banks are eventually forced to
make further moves in the same direction. Goodhart argues that if a central bank
was pursuing an inflation objective, the level of the official interest rate should be
random (around some constant mean), so that only the next move (back to the
mean) would be predictable.
In contrast, Blinder (1995, p.13) has implicitly argued that a sequence of predictable
interest-rate movements represents optimal behaviour, stating that ‘a little
stodginess at the central bank is entirely appropriate’. He suggests that central banks
follow a strategy in which movements in interest rates are smaller than optimal, but
are followed up with subsequent movements if things work out as expected.
There has been little formal justification for why central banks might act in this
way.11 In an attempt to fill some of the gaps, the remainder of this section is devoted
to discussing possible explanations of the observed pattern of interest-rate changes
(other than sub-optimal behaviour of the central bank).  The most plausible
explanations have their roots in the uncertainties that policy-makers face.
                                                                                                                                  
11 There is, however, an extensive literature on the issue of whether monetary policy should
smooth interest rates in the face of changes in money demand, with Poole (1970) being the
seminal article. For example, Mankiw and Miron (1991) have examined the issue of whether
central banks should smooth interest rates in the face of seasonal changes in the demand for
money. Mankiw (1987) and Barro (1989) have also argued that maintaining a smooth interest
rate may be optimal from the point of view of smoothing the inflation tax.11
3.3 Reasons Why Central Banks Engage in Interest-rate Smoothing
There are three broad lines of argument why central banks may want to smooth
interest-rate changes:12
•  slow adjustment of interest rates represents the optimal response to shocks,
even when there are no costs of adjustment;
•  when there are adjustment costs, slow adjustment of interest rates reduces
these costs; and
•  slow adjustment of interest rates is due to a combination of uncertainty and the
costs incurred in changing the direction of interest rates.
3.3.1 Slow adjustment can be optimal
It is sometimes argued that the positive autocorrelation of interest-rate changes is
prima facie evidence that central banks are not doing their job properly; that they
are not moving aggressively enough to offset shocks.  Certainly, one can build
simple models which predict that a central bank with an inflation target will deliver
uncorrelated interest-rate changes. However, slight variations to these models can
deliver systematically positively autocorrelated interest-rate changes (Appendix B).
The critical issue is whether the economy responds to a change in interest rates in
the same way as it does to various other shocks.  The model in Appendix B
illustrates that if the response patterns are sufficiently different, moving interest rates
multiple times in the same direction may represent the optimal policy response to a
shock.
3.3.2 Adjustment costs
If interest rates are costly to adjust, it may be sensible for central banks to move
gradually to their desired target.  The critical point is that the costs must be
increasing at an increasing rate in the size of the adjustment. If the costs are of this
form, moving in small steps minimises the total adjustment costs. In contrast, if
                                                                                                                                  
12 The issue of interest-rate smoothing is more fully discussed in (Lowe and Ellis 1997).12
there is simply a fixed cost of adjusting interest rates, small adjustments will be
ruled out, but so too would be multiple moves.
One reason why central banks avoid moving in one (large) step to the estimated new
desired interest rate is that this could be very disruptive to financial markets, and
could even threaten the stability of the financial system. In principle, a small change
in interest rates which is accompanied by expectations of further moves should have
a similar effect on long bond yields as a large, one-off move. However, in practice,
it is questionable whether this is the case. Many financial prices react slowly to
news. Recent experience suggests that even though a sequence of policy changes is
expected, the full reaction in financial markets does not occur up front, but gradually
over the period of adjustment of policy interest rates.  Partly as a legacy of the
history of relatively small movements, large up-front changes in policy interest rates
risk causing much larger movements in securities prices. Even without this history,
large unexpected changes in policy interest rates probably add to financial-market
volatility, and in some cases concentrate the losses in particular institutions, perhaps
threatening the stability of the financial system.
Similar issues arise for households and businesses. A gradual adjustment in policy
interest rates can provide breathing space for borrowers to re-arrange their financial
affairs, so that the liquidity effects of a change in interest rates are not as dramatic.
This line of argument is obviously more relevant in financial systems in which
variable-rate debt plays a significant role.
3.3.3 Uncertainty and costs of reversals
The most persuasive argument for moving gradually is that monetary policy is made
under considerable uncertainty. Policy-makers do not know the true model of the
economy, they do not know the exact impact that a change in interest rates will have
on activity and inflation, and it can be difficult to assess the current state of the
economy.
3.3.3.1 Uncertainty about the model
Blinder (1995) notes that uncertainty regarding the value of the parameters in the
policy-makers’ model justifies making smaller interest-rate movements than would
otherwise be the case. The idea, based on earlier work by Brainard (1967), is that as13
the interest rate is moved further away from its average value, policy-makers
become more uncertain about how a change in the interest rate will affect their
objectives. This increased uncertainty reduces the optimal size of the policy move.
While the idea provides a convincing rationale for policy-makers being cautious in
changing interest rates, it does not provide a complete explanation for multiple
moves in the same direction. It could only do so if, after having moved the interest
rate, the central bank learns some information which reduces the degree of
parameter uncertainty.  The gradual reduction in uncertainty would then lead to
multiple moves towards the target rate. A difficulty with this argument is that the
time between movements in policy interest rates is often too short for there to be
any significant reduction in the degree of parameter uncertainty.
3.3.3.2 Uncertainty and costly reversals
Another model of the effects of uncertainty is suggested by the work stimulated by
Dixit (1989).13 In attempting to explain the slow evolution of the capital stock to its
optimal level, Dixit proposed a model which considered the interactions of:
•  uncertainty about future returns;
•  the irreversibility of investment projects;14 and
•  the possibility of delaying investment.
The analogy to monetary policy is clear:
•  policy-makers are uncertain about the future state of the economy;
•  changes in the direction of interest rates are seen as costly; and
•  there is always the possibility of delaying an interest-rate change until the
policy-maker has more information.
                                                                                                                                  
13 For a comprehensive review see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
14 More recent models have allowed investment to be reversed, but at a cost (Abel et al. 1996).14
The investment literature makes the point that the ability to delay investment
decisions can profoundly affect the decision to invest today. If there are costs of
reversing an investment, making a decision to invest today involves giving up the
option of waiting for new information, and perhaps making a better decision
tomorrow. As a result, it may be optimal to delay investment, or to make a smaller
investment and subsequently increase its size if the uncertainty is resolved in the
direction that was expected. While a delay in investment is a common prediction of
these models, Abel et al. (1996) note that other outcomes are possible. For instance,
if the cost of future investment is expected to rise, delaying an investment may be
sub-optimal even in the presence of considerable uncertainty.
For these insights to apply to monetary policy, changing the direction of interest-rate
movements must be costly – that is, there must be a cost to ‘reversing the
investment’.  The costs might arise in terms of additional volatility in financial
markets and potential damage to the central bank’s reputation.
To investigate the issue of whether changes in the direction of the cash rate lead to
greater short-term volatility in security market yields we estimate the following
equation,
| | | | D D i r REVERSAL t t t t = + + + a b d e , (2)
where it  is either the 90-day bank bill rate or the 10-year bond rate, r  t  is the target
cash rate and REVERSAL is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there is a
reversal of policy on that day, and takes a value of zero otherwise. We use daily
data and restrict the estimation period to the period over which announcements have
been made. The results are presented in Table 3. If policy reversals cause increased
volatility in the yields on 90-day bills or 10-year bonds the coefficient on the
REVERSAL dummy variable should be significant and positive.15
Table 3: Interest-rate Changes and Market Interest Rates:
Regression Results
















Number of observations                     1 678                     1 678
Notes: (a) Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
(b) Sample period is from 23 January 1990 to September 1996.
(c) Interest rates are expressed as number of basis points.
In both equations, a change in the direction of monetary policy appears to be
associated with a larger than average movement in the market interest rate, with the
effect being particularly pronounced for the 10-year bond yield. The estimates
suggest that on days that policy is moved in the opposite direction from the previous
move, bond yields have tended, on average, to move by an additional 15 basis
points; for bill rates the figure is 6 basis points. This larger movement occurs despite
the fact that the change in direction was not always unexpected. The results also
confirm that the larger is the change in the cash rate, the larger the change in the bill
rate. This suggests that large changes in policy interest rates would induce more
volatility into the short end of the yield curve. There appears to be no such effect at
the longer end of the curve. While it is difficult to draw strong conclusions due to
the small number of reversals in the sample period, the results suggests that policy
reversals increase short-term volatility across the yield curve. This issue is a topic
for future research.
A more difficult issue to evaluate is whether this additional volatility is itself costly.
Perhaps more difficult still is the issue of whether reversals would continue to
generate additional volatility if they were more frequent. If reversals occurred as
often as continuations, would they be less newsworthy and would they invoke a
smaller reaction from the market? Or would the frequent reversals undermine
confidence in the central bank, ultimately leading to greater volatility in financial
markets?16
The issue of how frequent reversals might affect the credibility of the central bank
has importance beyond the implications for financial markets. If frequent changes in
the direction of interest rates undermine public confidence in the central bank,
inflation expectations might be higher than would otherwise be the case and the
climate for investment may be adversely affected.
In Australia, as in all developed countries, changes in interest rates attract
considerable public attention; on the day of the change, it is usually the leading story
in the media. The Reserve Bank’s practice of announcing and explaining interest-
rate changes has tended to make policy changes more newsworthy, which may have
made frequent changes in the direction of interest rates more difficult. In the absence
of clearly defined shocks (such as a large exchange-rate change) it may be difficult
for the central bank to make the case to the public that interest rates should be
lowered one month, raised the next, and then lowered again a month later.
Regardless of whether or not such a policy was ‘optimal’, the public would
probably see the central bank as indecisive. As discussed earlier, the flexibility to
change direction without adverse effects was an important reason why many central
banks in the 1980s did not announce changes to policy.
While announcements might make reversals more difficult, they have significant
benefits in terms of accountability and the transmission mechanism. These benefits
currently outweigh any reduced flexibility that might be associated with the
announcements. However, the need to minimise the probability of costly reversals
means some caution is called for in moving rates. By making a smaller change,
policy-makers can reduce the probability of having to make a costly reversal. If
developments turn out as expected, policy can be moved again in the same
direction; if the unexpected happens and it turns out that no change in policy was
required, the costs of reversing policy are saved. The end result of waiting for
uncertainty to be partly resolved is systematically positively autocorrelated interest-
rate movements and positively autocorrelated inflation and economic activity.
The major qualification to this line of argument arises if the size of the required
policy adjustment depends upon the speed and magnitude of the initial policy
adjustment. Suppose a delay in adjusting policy to an inflationary shock led to
inflation expectations rising. The end result would be much higher interest rates, as
the central bank struggled to reverse the rise in expectations of future inflation. In
this case, an early and large increase in interest rates may be warranted, despite the17
fact that an increase of this type increased the probability that the policy move
would have to be reversed.
Finally, the stronger is a central bank’s inflation record, the longer may be the
period it can wait before adjusting policy. If the central bank has high credibility,
inflation expectations are less likely to adjust up, and this should give the authorities
more scope to wait and to assess the exact nature of the shock and the appropriate
policy response. In so doing, increased credibility might provide more scope for the
central bank to avoid costly reversals of policy.
3.3.3.3 Uncertainty and the decision-making process
A third way that uncertainty contributes to the positive autocorrelation of
interest-rate changes is the impact that it has on the decision-making process. There
is rarely unanimity among experts concerning the exact magnitude of necessary
monetary-policy adjustments. Many of the differences of opinion arise from the
uncertainty regarding the current state of the economy, the exact nature of shocks
and the exact structure of the economy and the associated policy multipliers.
Decision making by committee creates an environment in which the various views
can be discussed and reduces the probability that extreme decisions are made.
However, committee-based decision making can also systematically affect the way
policy responds to shocks. It can lead to compromise solutions which involve a
smaller initial change in interest rates followed up by a further increase, when the
case becomes more compelling.
A related issue is that monetary policy needs to be broadly acceptable to the
community as a whole. Again, because of uncertainty about the future, it may be
difficult to convince the community that a large interest-rate change is the
appropriate response to a shock. The case for such a change is likely to depend
heavily on the central bank’s forecasts for activity and inflation. These forecasts
might differ from those of other forecasters and the public may not be convinced
that the large change in interest rates is required. With little history of large one-off
interest-rate movements, the public in most countries are unlikely to find such
movements acceptable. The ability of the central bank to convince the public of the
need for large movements in interest rates will depend importantly on the confidence
that the central bank enjoys in the community. A record of good policy-making
would undoubtedly assist in this regard. But, even central banks with good records18
must constantly weigh up the risks of policy errors as public support can quickly be
lost. As a result, to maintain a broad consensus concerning the direction of monetary
policy, interest-rate changes may be smaller and more gradual than would have
otherwise been the case.
3.4 An Assessment
Three of the defining characteristics of Australia’s recent monetary policy
arrangements are:
•  changes in policy interest rates have been explicit and the reasons for the
change are explained in detail;
•  individual changes in policy interest rates have tended to be large by
international standards; and
•  policy interest rates have typically been moved multiple times in one direction
before a move in the other direction is made.
As discussed above, clear announcements are not only important from the
perspective of accountability, but they also mean that interest-rate changes more
effectively influence people’s expectations about future economic and financial
conditions. In turn, the monetary transmission process should be quicker and the
amplitude of the interest-rate cycle smaller.
Beneficial announcement effects are more likely to be achieved if the changes in
policy interest rates retain their newsworthiness. If changes in rates occur extremely
frequently, or are very small, their newsworthiness is likely to be diminished, and
they are less likely to force a relatively quick change in banks’ posted lending rates.
Changes in these rates reinforce the attention that the change in official interest rates
receives. If policy interest rates were changed frequently, and/or by small amounts,
the immediate link between monetary policy and lending rates might be weakened,
reducing the overall effectiveness of the policy changes.
There is, however, no clear, unequivocal basis for deciding what is the optimal size
and pattern of interest-rate adjustments. The decision is influenced by the expected
overall move in rates that is required; by the impact that changes of various sizes19
will have on people’s expectations; by the costs that are paid if the policy change
has to be reversed; and by the degree of uncertainty. In turn, these factors will be
influenced by the nature of the forces necessitating the policy change, the
institutional structure of the economy and financial system, and the historical
context of policy changes.
The pattern of interest-rate changes that has been adopted by the RBA is one that
has delivered positively autocorrelated inflation rates. The same is true in almost all
countries. While the simple models of some economists suggest that this persistence
could be eliminated by changing the way in which central banks move their policy
instrument, this has rarely been attempted, or achieved, in the real world. The range
of uncertainties that policy-makers face provide a solid explanation for the
persistence of interest rates, and ultimately inflation rates. It is a question of
attempting to balance the beneficial announcement effects of relatively large
changes in interest rates against the costs that can arise if policy changes are
frequently reversed.
4. The Impact on Financial Markets
The move to a transparent approach to implementing policy has reduced volatility in
short-term interest rates and resulted in faster pass-through of policy changes to
lending and deposit rates of financial intermediaries.
4.1 Volatility in the Overnight Interest Rate
The panels in Figure 1 show daily observations of the overnight interest rate for the
period since the mid 1980s. The shaded areas in the pre-announcement period show
the informal operating levels that guided market operations.20







































































Figure 2 shows a measure of cash rate volatility over the same period.15
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The main points to note from these two figures are as follows:
•  First, volatility tended to decline progressively in the pre-announcement period,
as operating techniques were gradually refined after the start of deregulation.16
By late 1989, just prior to formally announcing changes in policy, daily
volatility had declined to around 25 basis points, compared with around
100 basis points in the mid 1980s.
                                                                                                                                  
15 For the period prior to making policy announcements, the observations represent the standard
deviation of the actual daily cash rate from the centre of the informal trading band; after
January 1990, volatility is measured using differences in the actual and announced cash rate
target.
16 Significant changes included: the start of dealing in repurchase agreements (repos) with the
authorised dealers; allowing authorised dealers to deal in repos with others in the market;
increasing the flexibility of the terms on which the Bank deals in repos; and the use of foreign
exchange swaps.22
•  Second, after the move to formally announcing policy changes, volatility fell
noticeably further. Currently, it is rare for the cash rate to deviate by more than
a few of basis points from the announced target. One of the reasons for this
appears to be that market participants assume that the Bank will keep rates
very close to the target rate, so that the demand curve for settlement balances
tends to be very elastic around the announced rate. The tighter range for the
overnight rate has not required the Bank to be more active in managing the
supply of reserves. Indeed, the opposite is the case. In the pre-announcement
period, around one in five daily market operations were more than one-quarter
of the size of banks’ settlement balances.17 In contrast, in the post-
announcement period, just one in 10 daily operations are associated with
transactions of this magnitude.
4.2 Influence on Other Short-term Interest Rates
Short-term market yields are, of course, closely related to expectations of the future
level of the cash rate. With the Bank announcing the target cash rate, and daily
volatility in the cash rate much reduced, one would expect a commensurate decline
in volatility in short-term yields, with yields unlikely to move significantly unless
views about the future direction of monetary policy change.
The three panels in Figure 3 show, respectively, the distribution of daily movements
in 30-day bill yields, 90-day bill yields and 10-year bond yields, divided into the
pre- and post-announcement periods.18 For bill yields, movements in the pre- and
post-announcement periods are strikingly different. In the pre-announcement period,
yields moved by more than 10 basis points on almost one in two days. In contrast,
the distribution of the daily change in short-term rates in the post-announcement
period tends to be much more clustered around zero. More than 90 per cent of
changes are 10 basis points or less, with rates rarely moving by more than 25 basis
points on any given day. The strong implication is that much of the noise in
movements in short-term rates has been removed by increasing the transparency of
monetary-policy actions. As expected, the change in procedures has not had a
significant impact on the distribution of daily movements in bond yields. These
                                                                                                                                  
17 Prior to July 1996, we have used banks’ loans to authorised dealers as the measure of reserve
balances.
18 The distribution for movements in 180-day bill rates is virtually the same as other bill yields.23
yields are influenced more by broad domestic and international economic
developments rather than changes in cash rates.
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4.3 Impact on Futures Trading
With relatively deep and liquid futures markets in Australia, many investors find it
more cost-effective to take on or unwind interest-rate exposures in the futures
markets rather than buying or selling securities outright. Turnover of 90-day bill
futures, for instance, is more than tenfold the turnover in physical bank bills. We
might expect, therefore, that the announcement of changes in policy may initially
show up in the level of activity on futures exchanges.24
Figure 4 shows the average volume of 90-day bill futures and 10-year bond futures
contracts traded around the dates of changes in policy. Volumes have been adjusted
to take account of the natural growth of the market, by expressing daily turnover as
a ratio of the average daily turnover in that year. A figure around one, therefore,
implies that turnover was normal on that day, numbers above/below one indicate the
extent to which turnover was above/below average.
Figure 4: Daily Futures Market Turnover
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In the period when announcements were not made, there was little impact upon
trading on the day when the Bank moved to implement a change of policy. This is
not surprising, given that it took time for market participants to assess whether the
movement in the cash rate represented a change to a new operating level or
day-to-day noise around an unchanged target. Over the course of the next few days,
however, it typically became apparent to the market that policy had, in fact, been
changed. The market gradually adjusted, as more participants acknowledged that a
change had taken place. Activity on the futures market rose, peaking at around 40 to
50 per cent above average four days after the Bank moved to implement the policy
adjustment. The adjustment continued over the course of a couple of weeks.25
In contrast, portfolio balancing occurs at a much faster pace now that policy
changes are announced. Turnover surges on the day of the announcement. Trading
in bill contracts is about 2.5 times larger than average, with turnover in bond
contracts almost 1.8 times higher than average. There is some residual rebalancing
on the day following the announcement, probably reflecting offshore investors
adjusting their exposures. Turnover quickly settles to around average levels
thereafter.
Figure 5 shows the behaviour of the physical 30-day bill yield around the time of a
change in monetary policy.19 In the post-announcement era, expectations of a
change in policy have typically built up in the month prior to the rate change, so that
about half the adjustment was typically priced into 30-day bill yields before the
announcement; the change is fully priced in on the day of the adjustment. One
reason why markets now better anticipate policy changes is because, by making
announcements, the Bank over time highlights the issues which are important in
setting monetary policy. Market participants are therefore in a position to assess
data in the economy as they become available and thereby make assessments about
policy settings. In the pre-announcement period, the adjustment path was very
different. The market typically priced in only a small part of the change in policy
prior to its implementation. It then went on to continue adjusting short-term yields in
the two or three weeks following the policy change, usually overshooting. In other
words, the adjustment phase was slower and much less well-defined.
                                                                                                                                  
19 Again, in the pre-announcement period, the mid-point of the band is taken as the appropriate
reference point.26
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4.4 Pass-through into Lending and Deposit Rates
In Australia, a high proportion of banking products have traditionally been priced
off short-term interest rates. Most loans for housing and for business have variable
interest rates, which are set by banks on the basis of the level of short-term interest
rates. With policy changes now more transparent, their flow-through to deposit and
lending rates could be expected to be faster. Table 4 shows the time lapse between a
change in the cash rate and the movement in the 3-month deposit rate, the mortgage
rate and the business loan indicator rate for each episode of policy easing and
tightening over the past decade. It shows the average time it has taken banks to
bring about a change in deposit and lending rates in response to changes in
monetary policy.20
                                                                                                                                  
20 An earlier paper by Lowe (1995) looked at the extent of the pass-through for the period from
1986 to 1994. He estimated that the pass-through of changes in the cash rate to 3-month
money market rates, housing mortgage rate and business indicator rates were 0.97, 0.65 and
0.89, respectively, over the long run.27
Table 4: Flow-through of Changes in Cash Rates
Lags in changes to deposit, mortgage and business indicator rates
3-month deposit rate Mortgage rate Business indicator rate
Tightenings
Pre-announcements
1985 4–5 weeks 20 weeks 9–15 weeks
1988–89 2–3 weeks 3–4 weeks 3–4 weeks
Post-announcements
1994 1–2 weeks 1–3 weeks 1–3 weeks
Easings
Pre-announcements
1986 2–3 weeks no change 4–9 weeks
1987 2–4 weeks 7 weeks 4 weeks
Post-announcements
1990–93 1–2 weeks 4–5 weeks 3–4 weeks
1996 1 week 1–2 weeks 1–4 weeks
The lag with which banks altered their deposit and lending rates fell substantially in
the second half of the 1980s, and was reduced further in the post-announcement
period. In the mid 1980s, banks took about one month to adjust deposit rates and up
to four to five months to adjust lending rates in response to tightenings of policy.
The lags were roughly halved in the tightening cycle in 1988–89 and halved again in
the 1994 phase. Changes to deposit and lending rates are now moved within one to
four weeks of the change in cash rates compared with upwards of 20 weeks in the
pre-announcement era.21
Another change is in the way banks pass through rate changes.  In the
pre-announcement period, business rates tended to be changed in small amounts
over a long period, with changes occurring in up to 10 steps. In contrast, recent
changes to cash rates have tended to be fully passed through in one step.
There are many other variables, such as the structure of banks’ deposits, the
riskiness of bank lending and the degree of competition in banking, that affect the
                                                                                                                                  
21 These figures refer to the time taken for the change in rates to become effective. Lags in
announcement of rate changes are significantly shorter.28
extent and the speed by which changes to monetary policy are reflected in
commercial banks’ borrowing and lending rates.  The gradual decline in banks’
deposits which paid a low interest rate and increased competition from non-bank
institutions in the housing market would have contributed to the faster pass-through
of monetary policy changes. Nevertheless, the unambiguous signal that policy has
altered has lead to a much greater awareness amongst banks’ customers of the
extent and the speed by which changes in policy show up in changes in banks’
interest rates.
5. Concluding Remarks
The move to announcing and explaining changes to the overnight interest rate has
brought with it a number of benefits. Market conditions are easier to manage, given
that the behaviour of participants is conditioned by the fact that they do not expect
the cash rate to move much away from the announced target. Benefits have spread
to the wider market, including less day-to-day variability in other interest rates.
Pass-through of policy changes into both deposit and lending rates has also
quickened, which together with the effect of announcements on expectations, may
have contributed to a speeding up of the transmission mechanism.  The
announcements have also increased the transparency and accountability of monetary
policy and helped to promote public understanding of the monetary-policy
framework.
The announcement and explanation of movements in official interest rates has not
led to increased delays in changing policy, as some had feared. In fact, the changes
in operating procedures, together with the adoption of an inflation target, have seen
policy become more forward-looking. As the experience of late 1994 illustrates, the
Bank has been prepared, when appropriate, to move interest rates in quite large
steps and by a relatively large amount in a short period of time.  Despite this,
movements in interest rates have tended to follow a relatively smooth pattern with a
sequence of moves being made in one direction. While a number of factors help
explain this pattern, the most plausible explanations centre on the uncertainty that
policy-makers face and the costs that would ultimately be incurred if the direction of
policy were to be changed too frequently.29
Appendix A:  Adjustment of Actual Cash Rate to Target Rate
Table A1 reports the estimation results for the following equation,
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where: rt  is the actual (unofficial) cash rate; and
rt  is the target cash rate.
Daily data were used in estimation and seven lags of the changes in both the actual
and target cash rate were included initially. We then used the general-to-specific
methodology to obtain a more parsimonious specification. The first sample period
(the ‘pre-announcement’ period) runs from 1 July 1985 to 22 January 1990. The
second period (the ‘announcement’ period) runs from 23 January 1990 to
2 September 1996.30
Table A1: Regression Results

















D in cash rate {t-4} -0.17
(0.05)
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D in cash rate {t-5} -0.06
(0.04)
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D in cash rate {t-6} -0.11
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D in target rate {t-4} 0.20
(0.08)
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Standard deviation of cash
rate changes
0.60 0.10
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.31
Appendix B:  A Model of Interest-rate Adjustment
Goodhart and Huang (1996) present a simple model in which the policy interest rate
varies randomly around a constant mean.  Their starting point is the following
inflation process,
p a fp g m t t t t I = + - + - - 1 1 , (B1)
where:  p is the inflation rate,  I is the policy interest rate and  m is a serially
uncorrelated shock to inflation.22 One could think of this shock as an ‘exogenous’
change in the exchange rate or wages.  In this model, inflation is persistent and
interest rates affect inflation with a lag. The central bank is assumed to know with
certainty that this model represents the true inflation process, and it also knows the
parameters with certainty. The objective of the bank is to minimise the expected













subject to Equation (B1). Without loss of generality we assume that p* is equal to






This rule means that the central bank sets the interest rate at the point where in
expectation it achieves its inflation objective. Given that m is a random variable, the
level of the interest rate is also a random variable (around a constant mean), with
past movements providing no information regarding the future level of interest rates.
This leads Goodhart and Huang to conclude that in a model with persistence and
lags, and with the central bank caring only about inflation, there should be no
interest-rate smoothing.
                                                                                                                                  
22 All parameters are assumed to be non negative and the policy interest rate is chosen after the
shock is known.32
Now consider what happens when we change the inflation process to the following,
p a fp g m bm qm hm t t t t t t t I = + - + + + + - - - - - 1 1 1 2 3. (B4)
The change here is that the shocks to inflation have different dynamic effects on
inflation than do changes in the interest rate. For particular values of the parameters,
this model allows the inflationary impact of the shock to build over time and then to
dissipate.
In this model the optimal interest rate rule is given by
It
t t t =
+ + + + - - a f b m qm hm
g
( ) 1 2 , (B5)
and the autocorrelation of interest rate changes by










f b h q f b h   , (B6)
where s is the standard deviation of the inflation shock.
Under some sets of parameters, the optimal interest-rate response to an inflation
shock is to increase the interest rate twice and then to reduce the interest rate in two
steps back to its initial value – similar to the general pattern observed in practice.
Whether or not such a pattern generates positively correlated changes in interest
rates on average, again depends upon the particular parameters. If h and q are close
in magnitude, then interest-rate movements are likely to exhibit positive
autocorrelation.  In contrast, if  h is zero, the correlation between interest-rate
changes will be negative.33
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